The Thomas Paine Caucus Addresses the Platform Committee of the Libertarian Party of the United States

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Dear Platform Committee: We of the Thomas Paine Caucus are submitting this proposed amendment to request that the Libertarian Party take a stand on what is "justly acquired" property, in order to clarify the current platform statement which ambiguously says: "Our bodies are our property every bit as much as is justly acquired land or material objects". The platform is not clear on how one justly acquires land or material objects that were not made by humans. Regarding that class of property, if one can legitimately call it property, we can learn from the founders, such as Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Adam Smith, and John Locke. Those libertarians guide us to the principle that, because land and natural resources were not produced by humans, they are subject to different standards of property rights than products that were produced by human effort. Yet many Libertarian Party members seem unaware of that principle, and assume that land is property in the same way as human-made products, while the platform has never taken a stand on what is "justly acquired" property. Because of the differing assumptions about property, the Libertarian Party will be pursuing divergent courses of action without the guidance of a clear definition of "justly acquired" property. To be the "Party of Principle", the Libertarian Party must have the fundamental debate and decide in the platform where it stands on the ownership of land and natural resources, and it must state its agreement with one or the other principle, or officially recognize both as acceptable under the libertarian principle. Without this declaration, it risks continuous strife and confusion resulting from undefined and thus misunderstood policy. Jack R. Jones for the Thomas Paine Caucus

A PROPOSAL TO THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY PLATFORM COMMITTEE For a statement on RIGHTFUL OWNERSHIP OF LAND, Based on classical libertarian principles of PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE "THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY" SECTION Of the LIBERTARIAN PARTY PLATFORM Jack R. Jones 4715 Rittenhouse Street Riverdale, Maryland 20737 301 - 277 - 2242 17 June 2000 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. The Proposal 2. Supporting Documentation A. A Landlord Is Really a Form of Government B. Land Rent Compensation: Its Compatibility With Human Natural History C. A Libertarian Case for Land Reform: The Right to Land Access D. A Libertarian Case For Land Reform: The Practical Benefits E. Full Employment Requires The Right to Land Access F. Questions About Land Rent Compensation G. Views of Famous Libertarians on the Right to Land PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY PLATFORM (Subject: Property Rights in Land) A) Main Amendments: Section I, "Individual Rights and Civil Order". Number 11, "The Right to Property" 1) Second paragraph, last sentence. Current wording: "Our bodies are our property every bit as much as is justly acquired land or material objects." Proposed wording: "Our bodies are our property every bit as much as are justly acquired material objects." 2) Proposed addition to follow the second paragraph: "Property is produced when labor is applied to land. Property becomes privately owned the moment it is produced. Ownership of such property may be voluntarily transferred to others, by sale or gift. By contrast, land refers to a volume of space at a particular location, and the natural resources located within that space. Therefore, land is different from human-made products, because land was not produced by any person. In order to have individual liberty, each individual must have the right to freedom of movement, and must also have the right to claim some land over which that individual has sovereign control. The amount of land that an individual may claim sovereign control over is limited by another person's right to freedom of movement. Specifically, each individual may claim sovereign control over some land, up to the point where the rental value of that land is equal to the average land rental value per person. If an individual later acquires additional land, so that person's total land rental value is more than per capita, that person would only have the right to limited sovereignty over that additional land: specifically, that person would owe land rent compensation, for restricting others' freedom of movement and self-sovereignty. The land rent compensation would be based on the annual market rental value of that additional land (not the buildings on that land). The rental value of that additional land should be determined through market processes. For example, the insurance industry and real estate industry produce assessments of location value separately from building value. Anyone who owes land rent compensation may either: a) pay it directly to any individuals whose freedom of movement and self-sovereignty were restricted due to that person's additional land claims; or b) choose a person or agency that has a record of accurate assessments and reliable allocation of land rent compensation."

Supporting Document A A Landlord Is Really a Form of Government There is no basic difference between a government and a landlord. Both have the following three traits: 1) Governments and landlords each claim the right to collect revenue from all occupants of a given territory. This revenue is called "taxes" when collected by governments, and is called "rent" when collected by landlords. 2) Occupants do not have the freedom to secede or to stop paying taxes or rent. Instead, they are told to "love it or leave it". Some governments may occasionally allow a region to secede, but it is not an automatic right. Similarly, a landlord may sometimes let an occupant secede, but only if the occupant buys his or her freedom, by purchasing some of the land, thereby obtaining freedom from paying rent to the landlord. That is like requiring an individual to pay the government in order to be allowed to secede. 3) Governments and landlords each claim that the right to collect taxes or rent is based on a legal document. That legal document is called a "constitution" in the case of a government, and is called a "deed" in the case of a landlord. But if the origins of constitutions or deeds are traced back, they are found to be based either on confiscation of territory, or arbitrary claims that rest on no clear legal principle. In cases where the origins of constitutions or deeds were based on confiscation of territory, does the passage of time make them legitimate? If it does, then anyone who endorses allowing landlords to collect rent without any legal limit must also endorse allowing governments to collect taxes without any legal limit. When the U.S. government originally bought Louisiana and Alaska, did that give the U.S. government the right to tax the inhabitants? In the few cases (if any) where a deed to land did not involve any confiscation from anyone during its history, the claim of ownership still does not rest on any clear and consistent legal principle. For example, suppose the legal principle is "first discoverer gets the land". But how much land can a person or government claim? Did the first person to enter North America have the right to claim the whole continent? Or suppose the legal principle is "to claim land, mix your labor with it, such as by cultivating it, or fencing it." That principle might enable someone to own the top few inches of soil, and the fence itself. But how would it enable someone to own a mineral deposit twenty feet below the surface, or air space twenty feet above? Also, how much mixing of labor is required? There must be some principled approach for determining legitimate claims to land. John Locke suggested that an individual has the right to remove land from the commons and claim it, as long as "there is enough and as good left in common for others." That principle could be applied by allowing any individual to claim land of average value, based on the market rental value of the location (not the value of any buildings on it). But if an individual acquires additional land, he would owe land rent based on the market rental value of that additional land, as compensation for displacing others from land. Titles to land would then be compatible with liberty. Mike O'Mara 3/30/2000

Supporting Document B Land Rent Compensation: Its Compatibility With Human Natural History Land rent compensation can resolve the Libertarian desire for an orderly society without relying on a coercive government to achieve that order. The loss of liberty throughout prehistory and history seems to be closely associated with the power of the average individual being usurped by the shamans, the warriors, or the elders. This loss has usually occurred where individuals have been constricted from moving away from coercion by natural environments, religious beliefs, lack of physical prowess, or lack of confidence in their own wisdom. The vast majority of governments that have come into being during historic time have done so through coercive means. The power elite, usually more powerful warriors, takes over a population, and, with the collusion of the shamans and elders, takes control of the land and the fruits of the commoner's labor. The individuals in their natural state are separated from their means of survival by the coercive power elite, who claim that they are the possessors of the land and therefore the rightful owners of the land. Then, to consolidate their power, they grant as an extension of sovereign immunity and eminent domain, ownership of land and fruits of labor to a less powerful elite, creating a coalition large enough to hold the balance of the population, the least powerful commoners, in servitude or slavery. In evolutionary terms, the inefficiency of this kind of government, wherein the productive members of society have to support the unproductive members, brings about the need for modification of that institution. And, if this cultural path is not modified, it eventually collapses. When these governments have collapsed, the societies that have most often survived and carried on saw the land they lived on as the group's territory. Through a pragmatic face to face democracy/republic, they apportioned the land and its resources for use on an individual and family basis. Examples that come to mind are the English medieval farm towns, West African hoe agriculturists, the Suquamish (especially pre-contact) of Washington State, and the Russian agricultural villages prior to the 1917 revolution. While the examples given are agriculturists or hunter gathers, the economics are the same. The whole group benefits economically by making sure each individual has an adequate resource base, fitted to their needs and abilities, from which to operate. Common ownership of the territory with individual use works quite well with hunting and gathering and translates well into sophisticated medieval agriculture. The translation from agriculture society to agriculture-manufacture society to agriculture-manufacture-service society could have worked well had it not been for the interference of the coalition that is the modern equivalent of the shamans, warriors, and elders, accumulating the wealth of the working commoners for themselves. One general problem of this kind of government is in accurate information feedback loops; the more over centralized the decision making apparatus the more likely a bad decision regarding the problem at hand. An example of this is in economics the worst feedback loop is centralized command and control; the best is the free market of all economic actors. For example, at present in the U.S.A. regarding economics, we do not have the best feedback loop, because we do not have a free market in land, but rather over-concentrated land ownership, wherein land owners can insulate themselves from free market rises in land prices. The landless have no protection from the free market's rise in land prices. In fact the over-concentrated land ownership pattern further increases the cost of land rental to the landless. If those landowners who claim more land than a per capita share of land rental value were required to pay land rent compensation for the additional land they claim, this would broaden the free market to increase non-landowners' influence on land use decisions. It is the task of the libertarian movement to improve the free market feedback loop by continuing to increase the number of people enjoying the fruits of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Magna Charta placed some limits on the power elite, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution increased the limits on the elite, and the War Between the States increased the limits on the power elite yet again. However, we are nowhere near finished yet. We still have an extension of sovereign power, in the grant of private ownership that allows all of us landowners to take from non-landowners the fruits of labor by way of increased rents to landlords, while protecting landowners from increased rents. For me it seems obvious that we need to move toward land rent compensation as one of the ways to practically increase the amount of liberty available to the common person. Jack R. Jones 4/12/2000

Supporting Document C A Libertarian Case for Land Reform: The Right to Land Access Land should not be treated as property in the same sense that human-made products, such as cars or furniture, are private property. Many libertarians throughout history have recognized that land should have a different legal status than human-made products. The need for different legal treatment of land was recognized by such libertarians as John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill, Albert Jay Nock, and Frank Chodorov. All of those libertarians favored land reform, land rent reform, or some means of granting free access to land value for every individual. John Locke's starting place was that property is produced when labor is applied to land. By contrast, land refers to a volume of space at a particular location, and the natural resources located within that space. Therefore, since land was not produced by any person, Locke proposed that an individual has the right to remove land from the commons, as long as there is "enough and as good left in common for others." A way to apply Locke's principle would to allow any individual to claim land of average value (based on the market rental value of the location, not the buildings on it). But if an individual acquires additional land, so that the total location value of his land is more than the per capita location value, he is thereby displacing other individuals from access to land value. Therefore, that individual owes land rent to others, as compensation for displacing them from owning land. Market processes should be used to determine how much displacement rent a particular landowner might owe. For example, the insurance industry and real estate industry produce assessments of location value separately from building value. Anyone who owes displacement rent may either: a) pay it directly to any individuals who were thereby displaced from access to location value; or b) choose a person or agency that has a record of accurate assessments and reliable, efficient allocation of the rent. Apparently, no libertarian has ever offered a detailed response to the above arguments. Only a few have even discussed the issue briefly. For example, Murray Rothbard, in For a New Liberty (1973), said that he accepted John Locke's view that property rights derive from mixing one's labor with land. However, Rothbard gave no explanation for his omission of Locke's requirement that there be "enough and as good left in common for others." The few other libertarians who have mentioned the issue have treated it in a similar cursory fashion. It's time for libertarians to address this issue directly. Mike O'Mara 3/30/2000

Supporting Document D A Libertarian Case for Land Reform: The Practical Benefits For two hundred years, other free market economists have not answered the claim made by some free market economists: that, even in a pure free market, our current system of land rights would inevitably lead to more concentrated ownership of land and industry, less productive investment, less efficient land use, and more poverty. The reasons for those effects are explained in the book, Land and Taxation, edited by Nicolaus Tideman (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1994). Here is an outline of the major arguments: In order to prevent those problems of our current system of land rights, some free market economists and libertarian authors have proposed that landowners who own more than a per capita share of land rental value be required to pay land rent compensation, based on the location value. The policy suggested here is a modified version of their proposal: the difference is that in the proposal here, any landowner would have the right to claim a per capita share of land rental value from the commons, without ever owing compensation for it, but if a landowner acquired additional land, he would owe land rent compensation for that additional land. Land rent compensation would prevent the following problems of our current system: Prevent Monopoly 1) Our current system of land rights results in more concentrated ownership over land value and industry (this would even occur in a pure free market). Concentrated ownership over land value and industry means more monopoly or more oligopoly, and therefore fewer choices for consumers, resulting in artificially lower supply, higher prices, fewer employment opportunities (and therefore lower wages), and a lower standard of living for most people. Such concentrated wealth and control over the economy would arise even in a pure free market because: a) Increasing one person's land means less land access for others, since land (spatial locations) cannot be produced by any person. As an alternative, requiring land rent compensation based on annual location value would provide rightful access to land (since no person produced the land). That way, people who own little or no land would receive land rent compensation, which they could then use to buy land or rent land. b) Those who own large amounts of valuable land can use it as collateral for loans, for buying up more land and industry, resulting in concentrated wealth and control over the economy. As an alternative, by requiring land rent compensation would place a limit on the extent to which land could be used as collateral for buying up land and industry, because requiring land rent compensation based on location value would lower the profit from land (not buildings), and therefore bring down the price of land. c) Landowners preempt their competitors from having access to land. For example, a chain of service stations that has most of the best corners in a town not only has a large market share, but at the same time preempts the opportunities of competitors, because land is limited. The same effect occurs with oil land, refinery sites, transmission rights of way, harbor sites, access to railroads and freeways, etc. As an alternative, a requirement of land rent compensation would place a limit on the extent to which landowners could preempt their competitors from having access to land - see (b). d) Land ownership provides a bargaining advantage. Labor starves when there is an endurance contest, and capital depreciates. But land in the vast majority of cases appreciates, and a landowner can also do work during the time that his/her land is being held idle. As an alternative, requiring land rent compensation would place a limit on the extent to which land ownership would provide a bargaining advantage over capital owners or labor - see (b). More Productivity 2) Without a system of land rent compensation, there is less productive investment. If a person can make a lot of money by investing in location value (which was not produced by any person, since no person made spatial locations), that lowers the amount of investment available for capital goods and human capital (education, medicine, child care), which do involve production. Less investment in capital goods or human capital means less productivity, and therefore artificially lower supply, higher prices, and a lower standard of living for most people. As an alternative, requiring land rent compensation would result in more productive investment, because it would place a limit on how much profit could then be made from land speculation or from land rent, so that more investment capital would be available for productive investment in capital goods and human capital, resulting in higher productivity. More Efficient Land Use 3) Without a system of land rent compensation, there is less efficient land use. Landowners are less motivated to be efficient than capital owners or labor, since labor starves when idle, and capital depreciates. Such inefficient use of land means that too much land will be held out of use or underutilized. As a result, there are fewer opportunities for job creation, factories, services, or access to parkland. This leads to more unemployment, higher prices, and a lower standard of living for most people. As an alternative, requiring land rent compensation would prevent extreme land use inefficiency. Just as a person who has paid for a reserved seat at a play is likely to use the seat or sell it to someone who will, requiring land rent compensation would provide an incentive to use that land efficiently. In summary, without a system of land rent compensation, there is: 1) more concentrated ownership over land value and industry; 2) less productive investment; and 3) less efficient land use. The result is more poverty. As an alternative, requiring land rent compensation would address those problems, thereby benefiting the economy. Mike O'Mara 4/12/2000

Supporting Document E Full Employment Requires The Right to Land Access Access to jobs is impossible without access to land. All jobs involve production of products and services, which all require inputs from land: energy, water, mineral resources, and location. So no job can be created without using land and natural resources. The people who control the land control the jobs. Land is essential for producing all wealth. Machinery is not. Even if a small percentage of people owned most of the machinery, that would not cause permanent poverty for others, as long as there is access to land. Those who owned no machinery could use land and natural resources to eventually produce their own machinery. But the more concentrated land ownership is, the more there is permanent poverty in society, because unemployed and landless people have no alternative except to beg the landowners for access to low paying jobs, and they also have to pay higher prices for land, energy, mineral resources, machinery, and consumer products. When the first person reached North America, did that person have the right to claim the entire territory, and make everyone else pay for the right to use the land and natural resources? If not, then how much land does one person have the right to own? A libertarian answer seems to be that each person has the right to remove a per capita share of land from the commons; if a person acquires additional land, then he would owe compensation to others, based on the land rental value of that additional land. No person produced the land (i.e., natural resources and spatial locations). Land is different from machinery, because machinery is produced by human effort. So, property ownership over land should be treated differently than property ownership of machinery, buildings, and other human-made products. However, land should be privately owned and controlled, because that allows better feedback and incentives than government control of land. Requiring land rent compensation would lead to more efficient land use, because it would raise the cost of holding land out of use for speculation. As a result, there would be more incentive to put vacant or underutilized land into better use. So, it would lead to more land on the market, and therefore would lower the price of land. With lower land prices, this would make more affordable housing, offices, and factory space available, and allow lower costs for consumer goods as well. With lower land prices available to businesses (and with consumers having more money left to spend on other consumer goods), more jobs would be created. The result would be full employment. Mike O'Mara 4/12/2000

Supporting Document F Questions About Land Rent Compensation The proposal here is that each person has a right to claim a per capita share of land from the commons; if a landholder acquires additional land, then he would owe land rent compensation, based on the market rental value of that additional land (meaning the value of the location, not the buildings). There are some people who are persuaded of many of the benefits of land rent compensation, but have questions about the effects. The following are some of the most common questions about land rent compensation: 1) Separating Land Value From Building Value Q: Is it possible to assess land value separately from building value? A: Land is already assessed separately from buildings on a regular basis, by the real estate industry and the insurance industry. Also, economist Nicolaus Tideman has proposed a market mechanism for assessing land rental value (Land Economics, 1990, volume 66, pages 341-355): Any person could enter the market as a land value assessor, and they would each pick which neighborhoods they want to assess (there could be a requirement that an assessment must include at least a certain number of neighboring properties, such as at least 200 lots). Each participating assessor would post a bond at the beginning of the year, based on a percentage of the total value they estimate for that land. The assessor making the highest assessment would receive a percentage of any land rent compensation collected that year. However, if the highest assessment is set too high (i.e., no one is actually willing to buy a plot of land in the neighborhood that year, at that rate of land rent compensation), then the highest assessor must pay the difference, out of the bond that was posted. In that way, the market for land assessors would lead to land rent compensation set at the optimum level. 2) Government Corruption Q: If there is a requirement of land rent compensation, won't that lead to government corruption, handling all that revenue? It does not necessarily have to be the government that collects and distributes any land rent compensation. Each individual could pick their own agency to collect the land rent compensation owed to them (if any). Since the rental value of sites would be public knowledge, agencies would know the total land rental value owed by each landowner. Each person could pick the agency with the lowest administrative cost. The assessed rental value of sites can be published each year, making the information easily available. 3) Forcing People Off Their Land? Q: As the land value rises in a region, won't the rising land rent compensation force some people off the land, if they can't afford to pay the land rent compensation? A: Under our current system, there are people who are forced off the land, if they can't afford to pay the mortgage, or can't afford to pay the rent for their apartment, office, store, etc. By contrast, that would be less of a problem with a system of land rent compensation. First, each person who owns no land would receive some land rent compensation, which could be used for paying rent or buying land. Second, the price of land would be lower under a system of land rent compensation, because annual payment of land rent compensation would make it less profitable to hold land out of use for speculation. Third, each landholder would have the right to some land that would be exempt from owing land rent compensation, as long as that land was per capita rental value at the time the landholder declared the exemption. That landholder would not ever owe any land rent compensation, unless he acquired some additional land. In some cases where a landholder owns some additional land, and therefore owes land rent compensation, the location might later rise significantly in value, so that the landowner may not be able to afford the higher land rent compensation that would then be owed for that additional land - but that does not mean he would necessarily have to vacate the land and sell it, if he did not want to. The landowner would just have to make higher use of that additional land. Also, note that he could have secure occupancy of his home, by making it his site that is exempt from ever owing land rent compensation, and reserving any additional land for non-residential land uses. Similarly, a person who wanted secure possession of some parkland, or a historic building, could make that his site that is exempt from ever owing land rent compensation. For all three reasons, then, there would be more secure use of land under a system of land rent compensation than under our current system, or under any other system. Also, because land rent compensation would make it less profitable to hold land out of use for speculation, it would increase the efficiency of using land. As a result, it would lead to more employment, higher wages, and lower costs for consumer goods. 4) Overbuilding and Shortage of Parkland? Q: Would a system of land rent compensation lead to an incentive to overbuild, resulting in a shortage of parkland and open space? A: Since a system of land rent compensation would make it less profitable to hold land out of use for speculation, land would be used more efficiently. Some land would be put into use for residences or businesses. But that does not mean that land would be overbuilt. Because a system of land rent compensation would make land less expensive (see Question 3), more people could afford land, and each could then decide what to do with his land. Some may wish to use their land for low density use, and others may choose to use their land for parkland, just as supporters of the Nature Conservancy maintain wilderness land. By contrast, the land that is now held out of use by land speculators under our current system is usually not made available to the public as parkland, and is certainly not being used as a reliable wilderness preserve if it is being used for speculation. In addition, since a system of land rent compensation would encourage more efficient land use, it would encourage filling in of land in cities, which would decrease urban sprawl. Also, any person who wanted secure possession of some parkland could make that his site that is exempt from owing land rent compensation (see Question 3). 5) Unfair to Charge Those Who Help Raise the Value of Land? Q: Suppose a person notices that a certain location would be a terrific place for a ski resort. After the resort is built, people move there, and the land rental value rises, so the person who built the ski resort winds up owing more land rent compensation, based on the increased land rental value. Isn't that unfair, since the person who built the ski resort is the main person who raised the value of the land? A: The land was already there, and was already a good location for a ski resort. The developer was simply the first person to discover a new use for the location, just as an inventor was the first to discover that electricity can be used to make a telephone work. The laws of nature were already there before someone discovered them, just as the land was already there. Under our current system, in the case of the first discoverer of an invention, the discoverer can obtain a patent, giving him a temporary monopoly (for a somewhat arbitrary number of years), as an incentive for invention. Many libertarians even object to issuing a temporary patent monopoly to the inventor. Yet in the case of land, a person can buy the land, and then have a permanent monopoly over that location, merely for being the first to discover that it is a good location for some purpose (e.g., a ski resort). Others might eventually build ski resorts at nearby sites (if there are any suitable ones). But they will never have the same quality location the first person picked. That person will always have a complete monopoly over that exact location, which can be a more powerful monopoly than a temporary patent. As an alternative, with a system of land rent compensation, as other people build residences or businesses nearby, there will be a gradual rise in the land rental value, and therefore the annual land rent compensation owed would gradually rise along with it. So, the first discoverer of that use for the site will gradually obtain less monopoly privilege from owning that location. This is analogous to the case of an inventor, whose patent monopoly for his discovery is currently for a limited number of years. Note that the landholder would have the option of making it his site that is exempt from ever owing land rent compensation - so, he would only owe land rent compensation if he acquires additional land. Either way, a system of land rent compensation would place a limit on concentration of land ownership. Mike O'Mara 4/12/2000

Supporting Document G Views of Famous Libertarians on the Right to Land Thomas Paine: "[I]t is the value of the improvement, only, and not the earth itself, that is individual property. Every proprietor, therefore, of cultivated lands, owes the community a ground-rent (for I know of no better term to express the idea) for the land which he holds; and it is from this ground-rent that the fund proposed in this plan is to issue. ...The plan I have to propose...is, To create a national fund, out of which there shall be paid to every person, when arrived at the age of twenty-one years...a compensation in part, for the loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the introduction of landed property.... "Man did not make the earth, and though he had a natural right to occupy it, he had no right to locate as his property in perpetuity any part of it; neither did the Creator of the earth open a land-office, from whence the first title-deeds should issue." (Agrarian Justice, 1797). John Stuart Mill: Landlords "grow richer as it were, in their sleep, without working, risking, or economising." It is "a kind of income which constantly tends to increase, without any exertion or sacrifice on the part of the owners." (Principles of Political Economy, bk.5, ch.2, sec.5) Adam Smith: "[G]round-rents...are a species of revenue which the owner, in many cases, enjoys without any care or attention of his own. Though a part of this revenue should be taken from him in order to defray the expenses of the state, no discouragement will thereby be given to any sort of industry." (The Wealth of Nations, Random House 1937 ed., pp. 795-6). Thomas Jefferson: "Whenever there is any country uncultivated lands and unemployed poor it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural rights. The earth is given as a common stock for man to labor and live on." (letter to Madison's father, Reverend Madison.) John Locke: "...Every man has a 'property' in his own 'person'. This nobody has a right to but himself. The 'labour' of his body and the 'work' of his hand, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. ... For this 'labor' being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. ... "It will, perhaps, be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns or other fruits of the earth, etc. makes a right to them, then one may engross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of Nature that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too. ..." "He that had as good left for his improvement as was already taken up needed not complain, ought not to meddle in what was already improved by another's labour...." "[I]t was impossible for any man, this way, to entrench upon the right of another or to acquire to himself a property to the prejudice of his neighbor, who would still have room for as good and as large a possession...." (*Second Treatise of Government*, ch.5, sec.26-35)

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